This paper examines linear income taxation in a model where preferences over relative consumption are only exhibited by some individuals in the population. This heterogeneity in preferences generates several interesting issues in the optimal tax context. We analyze cases where the tax authority (1) uses a non-welfarist objective (one which places variable weight on the welfare of relatively-concerned agents), or (2) remains ignorant of preference heterogeneity and maintains a standard social welfare function. Numerical results are obtained to illustrate 'optimal' tax parameters. A key result is that a government which understands the extent of relative consumption concerns -but places no social weight on individuals with such preferences -nevertheless sets a significantly more progressive tax system than a government ignorant of relative-consumption motivations.
Introduction
The possibility that individuals care not only about their own material well-being -but also about their well-being relative to others in society -has long aroused interest among economists. One familiar area of inquiry has been to investigate the behavioral consequences of agents' concern not just with their own consumption, c, but also with this consumption relative to some population average consumption, c/c. Economic models with this feature typically proceed by assuming that all individuals have identical attitudes towards relative standing. By contrast, this paper takes as its starting point a society where only a subset of the population is motivated by relative consumption concerns. This assumption is realistic but non-trivial, since although concern with relative standing may be an important characteristic for policy makers to consider, the government of such a society -as well as individuals within it -will likely be unable to directly identify the relatively-concerned. How will tax policy be affected by this heterogeneity, if at all? Extending the general methodology of Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) , I study the features of a linear tax system which a government motivated by redistributive goals would impose on such an economy. The objective of this paper is twofold. The first goal is to understand how the presence of preference heterogeneity affects optimal taxation relative to that in homogenous populations. Optimal tax rates are determined numerically. The second (related) goal is to examine the welfare consequences of ignoring preference heterogeneity. To address this objective, we compute the optimal rates which would be set by a government that is unaware of the existence of the relatively-concerned, and thus bases tax policy on an incorrect distribution of underlying abilities.
Recent empirical work has begun to shed light on the existence of relative consumption concerns in real-world situations. Luttmer (2005) and Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) find empirical evidence showing how measures of reported well-being tend to diminish with the earnings and consumption of neighbors. 1 Employing regression analysis, these studies report conditional average effects of relative standing on reported well-being, which by definition vary among the sample. . Although these studies substantiate the existence of relative-consumption effects among individuals, they do not concretely pin down the distribution of theses attitudes in the population. At very least, casual empiricism suggests that some people care very much about their standing in relation to society, while others significantly less so.
If indeed relative consumption concerns are present socially, there is arguably a scope for governments to improve social welfare through policy. At the heart of the issue is a 'positional externality' (Frank, 2005) : individuals that care about relative consumption tend to increase labour supply in an attempt to improve their social position. Of course, others follow suit, so that in equilibrium there is no change in relative standing but all agents are working harder. Tax policy may be used to control this externality. Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) demonstrate that a utilitarian government should implement a more progressive linear tax scheme when individuals have relative consumption as part of their preferences. Oswald (1983) extends this analysis to a non-linear setting, and indicates how marginal tax rates are optimally higher in a 'jealous' economy. These studies use a standard social welfare function that includes 'comparison preferences' as part of the social objective. Avoiding the social welfare approach, Persson (1995) and Corneo (2002) show how increased progressivity in income taxation can lead to Pareto improvements provided that pre-tax earnings are not too widely distributed. Ireland (1998) obtains similar results in a model where individuals expend resources to improve their perceived status in the population. In general, the case for progressive taxation and redistribution is strengthened when relative consumption concerns are present.
The key question of this paper is to what extent increased progressivity is optimal when heterogeneity over both preference types and earning abilities co-exist. A number of new issues are introduced by allowing this kind of heterogeneity. First, it is likely that preference-types are unobservable by the government, owing to different (ability, preference) types earning the same gross income. 2 If so, an attempt to control a relative-consumption externality through income taxation can inadvertently distort the decisions of those who do not make comparisons to others. Since individuals have different underlying preferences, a government faces a tradeoff between mediating the consumption externality and satisfying standard redistributive objectives. 3 Second, it is also 2 Boadway et. al (2002) consider optimal taxation in a model where individuals differ along two dimensions: ability and preference for leisure. In their paper, the government cannot distinguish the leisure preference by observing earnings alone. The model used here is conceptually different, since agents overwork by choosing labor supply strategically.
3 O'Donoghue and Rabin (2006) undertake a similar exercise with respect to sin taxes. The economy of interest is populated by agents who differ along two dimensions: inherent earning ability (indexed by w) and concern with relative consumption levels. Consider first the preference dimension of heterogeneity. An 'ordinary' agent (labelled type o) has preferences over ownconsumption (c) and labour-effort (L) represented by:
with
Alternatively, an agent may be concerned not only with his own consumption, but also with that of a group of his neighbors. Such an agent is labelled as type r, and his utility function is given by:
β > 0 parameterizes the magnitude of relative consumption concern among these agents, and β = 0 would imply that type r's are identical to type o's.c represents the average consumption level within type-r's reference group, a concept that will be made more precise below. For analytical simplicity, this concern enters additively into the r-agents' preferences, and these agents share identical sub- 
Labour Supply and Consumption: No Taxation
In the laissez-faire (no tax) environment, the optimizing behavior of each agent-type is straightforward. Own consumption is governed by the individual's budget constraint c i = w i L i . Thus (dropping subscripts) type o chooses L to maximize u(wL, L), with first-order condition:
Denote the solution to (3) as L o (w i ), which yields the indirect utility function
The behavior of individuals concerned with relative consumption is somewhat more complex.
An agent of type (r, i) cares about his own-consumption as well as his consumption compared to that of his reference group. Each such agent takes the average consumption level as given. I model the reference group as a neighborhood of individuals with similar abilities and therefore similar earnings. Falk and Knell (2003) demonstrate that it is both theoretically and empirically unrealistic to suppose that individuals make comparisons to the entire population, and instead tend to form a reference group with those with similar characteristics.
Thus, consider the labour-choice problem of a type (r, i) individual who compares himself to a community consisting entirely of other (r, i) individuals. His choice of L is made to maximize (2) average consumption make others feel worse). They show that the presence of jealousy is sufficient to stimulate extra labour supply, and that this effect is strengthened when individuals also attempt to keep up with the Joneses. For example, a Cobb-Douglas utility function with arguments (c, L,c) exhibits jealousy but not (KUJ). Type r individuals would still work more than their type o counterparts, but the extent of this extra work would be unaffected by the magnitude of average consumption in the neighborhood.
subject to c = wL and givenc:
(4) can be solved implicity for L(w,c): this is a reaction function stipulating individual labour supply given a level of average consumption in the reference group. 5 In a symmetric Nash equilibrium, L(w,c) is the same for all r-agents with ability w, thus average consumption in this group is c = wL(w, wL). Substituting this expression into (4) yields:
The implicit solution to (5) is the equilibrium labour supply of type (r, i), denoted L r (w i ). Since v (·) > 0, it can be seen that a type (r, i) agent supplies more work effort in equilibrium than
implying that the r-type individual 'overworks' relative to a similarly-abled type o. In other words, since additional labour supply has no effect on relative consumption in equilibrium, type r is engaged in a positional battle where the extra labour supply of neighbors forms a negative externality (see e.g. Frank, 2005) . The degree of additional labour supply on the part of r-agents varies according to ability, although the magnitude of this difference may increase or decrease with ability, in general.
Labour Supply and Consumption: Linear Income Taxation
It is straightforward to extend the preceding model of labour supply to one in which the government imposes a linear income tax of the form T (Y ) = tY − k, where t > 0 is the marginal tax rate on earned income and k is a lump sum transfer (or tax) given to all taxpayers. A linear tax is clearly a simplification, but allows us to focus on the distributional impacts of taxation across preference types without the complication of incentive compatibility constraints and a possible multidimensional screening problem. Consumption for each agent becomes c = w(1 − t)L + k. 5 Persson (1995) follows a similar game-theoretic approach to determine labour supply. His model involves a twoagent case where each agent has a different ability. By contrast, agents here are identical within a reference group, but there are I reference groups, each corresponding to a different ability. (4) is akin to equation (2) in Dupor and Liu (2003) , except there are I such conditions in this model: one for each ability level.
Thus, labour supply for type o's must satisfy the first order condition: t, k) ). For type r's, the first order condition for labour supply becomes:
At this point, I introduce the possibility that the reference group for an individual of type (r, i) may also include some individuals of type (o, j) with i < j; that is, 'ordinary' types of higher ability who earn the same (pre-tax) incomes as a given set of r types with lower abilities. Recall that in 
Call the w j satisfying (8) In equilibrium, the relative proportions of o to r types in such reference groups is indeterminate.
Let ρ i be the fraction of type r's in a reference group defined by abilities (i, j) as above. Then average consumption in this group is:
I assume that the imposition of redistributive taxation in this economy does not immediately alter the reference-group. 7 If so, average consumption in each reference group is a linear combination 7 The model presented is static, but it is possible to imagine how reference groups might change dynamically with heterogeneity in preference groups. Post-tax, type (r, i) might respond to the presence of type (o, j)'s in the neighborhood by supplying more labour, such that the net income (i.e. consumption) of (r, i) now exceeds that of type (o, j). Despite an immediate utility gain from these events (because c r i >c i ), r-types may subsequently compare of the post-tax incomes of types (r, i) and (o, j). The equilibrium labour supply of the r-types in each group is the L which solves (7), with average consumption given bȳ
Call this solution L r (w i , ρ i , t, k). How is ρ i determined? A natural possibility is that it reflects the relative proportions of abilities (r, i) and (o, j) in the population. In following sections, it will be convenient to define p i in this sense:
As is well known, the labour supply response of type o individuals to tax parameters is a combination of income and substitution effects. I do not elaborate upon these here. For type r, however, there is an additional channel by which changes in tax parameters affect labour supply.
Recall that these individuals respond strategically to the labour supplies of others in the reference group, through (7). I term this the reference-group effect. 8 The overall direction of this effect is ambiguous in equilibrium. The reaction function of a type r is L r (w, t, k,c). Then the referencegroup effect considers:
To illustrate this ambiguity, suppose ρ < 1, so that the decisions of (o, j) types affect the labour supply of type (r, i)'s in the neighborhood viac i . An increase in t may be expected to decrease the labour supply of type (o, j), but average consumption in the group may tend rise or fall overall depending on the response of type r's to this change. The optimal response of type (r, i) to a decrease in L o (ŵ i , t, k) may actually be an increase in labour supply.
Since the direction of ∂L r /c is itself ambiguous, it similarly impossible to determine the sign ∂L r /∂p. An increase in the fraction of ordinary types in a reference group may either increase or decrease the work incentive of relative consumption concerned types in the same group. Figure 1 depicts the variability in labour supply due to changes in the form of the reference group. Two themselves with a group with the same (higher) net incomes. This group could include a set of type (o, m), where wm > wj, given that net incomes increase monotonically with ability.
scenarios are shown (corresponding to the numerical example in Section 3): one for a high marginal tax rate, and one for a lower rate. In each case, k is set at zero. For the case shown, labour supply decreases monotonically in p. That is, a type r with a given wage (here, w = 1.4) works harder in the presence of more type o's.
'Optimal' Linear Taxation
As described above, attention is restricted to a linear tax system that a government with a possibly non-welfarist objective would impose in this economy. The government can always observe incomes but not necessarily preference types. If preferences are unobservable, each agent must face the same marginal tax rate and receive the same transfer, obviating the need to be concerned with incentive compatibility constraints as in a non-linear optimal tax problem. However, lacking unambiguous analytical results for the optimal tax system chosen under objectives described below, I do not explicitly present a solution to the optimization problem here. The next section includes numerical results to provide some results for the model.
The policy problem of setting a linear tax system is investigated under two sets of assumptions about the government's capabilities. In the first case, labelled 'perceptive,' the government understands the existence of preference heterogeneity and knows the proportions of each type in the population. In the second case, labelled 'ignorant,' the government assumes that all preferences are of the ordinary variety. Observing (pre-tax) incomes, it misperceives the true distribution of underlying abilities, and believes higher incomes on average to be the result of higher abilities than actually exist. In this sense it unconsciously ignores the relative consumption externality among r-types.
The social objective of the perceptive government is given by: 
The perceptive government chooses t and k to maximize (13) subject to budget balance
where R ≥ 0 is a revenue requirement. The expression in the round brackets on the right hand side of (15) is simply the average gross earnings of individuals under some (t, k) and potentially heterogenous reference groups (as given by ρ i ).
Equation (14) An ignorant government observesĨ = I income levels, and assuming ordinary preferences for all agents deduces a population distribution of abilitiesp 1 type w 1 ,p 2 type w 2 , etc. The social objective of the ignorant government is given by:
This policymaker places identical social weight on all agents since it does not consider preference heterogeneity. Instead, it chooses (t, k) to maximize (16) subject to what it believes to be the budget constraint:
Lastly, I consider a hypothetical situation where the government is still restricted to linear tax systems, but can observe preference types and therefore condition the tax system on this variable. For type-o agents, the utility function is simply 11
9 It is likely that this budget constraint would not be balanced after-tax. I account for this in numerical simulations by reducing or increasing k correspondingly.
10 If the government were utilitarian and the population entirely composed of type o's, there would be no social desire for redistribution. 11 The compensated and uncompensated elasticities of labour supply are identical in this case and equal unity when the exponent on labour is quadratic.
and for type r: 
The 'overwork' of type r is given by:
This difference is increasing in β (relative consumption concern), decreasing in α (labour disutility), and ambiguous in w (ability). Similar results are obtainable for consumption differences. Intuitively, an increase in concern for relative consumption worsens the level of over-consumption by type r's.
With linear taxation in place, the labour supply
Assuming that there is pre-tax migration (so that the reference group for ability type (r, i) includes a fraction (1 − ρ i ) of type o's with abilityŵ i from (8)), we have (dropping subscript i):
where 
In either case, the labour supply of type r's depends on the income guarantee, k, despite the absence of direct income effects in labour supply. It can be shown for this functional form that ∂L r /∂k < 0 with or without ρ = 1. Intuitively, an increase in k (which is received by all consumers)
weakens the incentive to work harder, since the marginal return to relative consumption from work is smaller. It becomes more difficult to outperform the reference group at the margin. Note also that the sign of ∂L r /∂t < 0 is ambiguous for type r, although increases in t unambiguously lead to labour supply reductions for type o via the substitution effect. Suppose ρ = 1. Then an increase in t has two effects for type r's: first, it encourages them to work less (through the standard substitution effect); second, it encourages them to work more (since it dampens the work effort of others in the reference group and hence their consumption as well). The latter effect is strongest when ρ → 0 -the reference group is almost entirely o-types -in which casec falls unambiguously and M RS r (c, L) rises. It is possible that an increase in the marginal tax rate, if not accompanied by a sufficient increase in transfers, could actually worsen the relative consumption externality in this case.
Numerical Results
Numerical simulations of the model are undertaken with I = 3 underlying ability types. Individual and type (o, 3) belong to reference group 2). Type (r, 3)'s form a reference group unto themselves.
I assume that abilities are independently distributed across preference types with p 1 = 0.3, p 2 = 0.5 and p 3 = 0.2. Thus, the underlying ability distribution is roughly skewed right for both preference groups. The proportion of r types is set at q r = 0.5 (so 50% of agents are of each type).
Recall that a perceptive government understands the existence and extent of each type of preference in the population, and therefore also the relative consumption externality among the type r's. An ignorant government believes the pre-tax distribution to be generated by a different distribution of earning abilities and 'ordinary' preferences. Figure 2 illustrates both cases of government perception for the present example. Note also the size of pooling which occurs given migration between type o's and r's pre-tax. Specifically, For the simulations, the function ω = (V ) 1/2 is used. Thus, the social objective of a perceptive government is:
and that of an ignorant government is:S
where (as in Figure 2 If it places equal social weight on both types of agent, it sets a 30.3% marginal rate and returns 13.8% of average income to each taxpayer when there is are mixed reference groups (ρ variable).
This is understandably a much more progressive system than that set by a government which ignores relative consumption effects (i.e. t = 7.2%, k = 4.1%). The ignorant government imposes a tax system not much different than that in which there are no type r's in the population (the final row of Table 1) . Table 3 presents agents' welfare for the laissez-faire scenario ('LF') as well as under tax schemes when ρ is variable. The first three rows are of greatest interest. Redistributive taxation by a perceptive government benefits the lowest two ability types for both types, relative to laissez-faire.
Notably, this result holds for type r's when a = 1 as well: i.e. relative to no redistribution, a majority of r types fare better when redistribution is imposed even when their group is given no social consideration. Indeed, (r, 2) and (r, 3) derive greater benefits when their welfare is not explicitly considered in the social objective. The results also indicate the reference group effect on tax schedules. For example, Table 1 illustrates differences in the progressivity of taxation when type o's are pooled in the reference groups of type r's. Figure 1 suggests that the equilibrium labour supply of type r's tends to decrease in ρ for this example. Thus, as ρ approaches 1, optimal tax rates fall. A similar result holds for the observable-type scenario shown in Table 2 .
T ype o T ype r
V o (w 1 ) V o (w 2 ) V o (w 3 ) V r * (w 1 ) V r * (w 2 ) V r * (w 3 ) LF
Conclusion
This paper has investigated the properties of a linear taxation system when only a subset of agents in the economy have relative consumption concerns. Previous models of taxation with relative consumption effects (Boskin and Sheshinski , 1978; Oswald, 1983; Persson, 1995; Ireland, 1998; Corneo, 2002) have typically avoided this issue by assuming the same population-wide preferences over relative consumption. In those environments, increases in the progressivity of the tax system may be recommended, since the relative consumption externality is then controlled to a greater extent. The goal here has been to examine whether this result continues to hold when there is heterogeneity in preferences with respect to relative consumption and the government can place variable weights on each type of individual. This question has been examined in a model where relative-consumption concerned individuals strategically choose labour supply in a neighborhood that includes individuals of similar earning abilities.
Using numerical simulations with quasi-linear preferences, I demonstrate three key findings.
First, the unobservability of preference types may generate high optimal marginal tax rates, even in the case where no social weight is placed on individual welfare losses from the relative consumption externality. This leads to an unlikely result: by concerning itself only with the welfare of 'ordinary' types, the government unintentionally mediates the relative consumption externality among type r's as well. Second, the optimal progressivity of the tax system depends on the nature of individuals' reference groups. The 'reference group effect' (where changes in tax parameters influence labour supply through average consumption in the neighborhood) can be magnified when r-types compare themselves to o-types in the population. Thus, different tax schedules are optimal (given the objective of the government) depending on the extent of pooling between type o's and r's. Finally, a tax authority which is ignorant of the relative consumption externality may mistakenly set a rather non-progressive system, which achieves neither the 'best' redistributive policy nor mediates the relative consumption externality. Ironically, social welfare could be improved by acknowledging the existence of relative consumption effects, even if no weight were actually placed on the welfare of individuals with this behavioral feature.
The analysis presented is incomplete and dependent on specific functional forms of preferences. It would be useful to more carefully characterize the optimal linear tax policies under more general specifications. Lastly, the assumption of linearity of the tax system is unrealistic and limits the instruments available for policy. Expanding the analysis to account for more general tax functions should uncover possibilities for welfare improvements among both ordinary and relativeconsumption concerned individuals. 
